Introduction
Why did Southerners seek a new fugitive slave act as part of the Compromise of 1850?
What did the act materially contribute to the protection of the South's "peculiar institution"? Historians generally have been quite coy about describing southern motives for demanding the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Yet the passage of the fugitive slave act as part of the compromise remains a puzzle for several reasons.
First, the compromise's admittance of California not merely tipped the U.S.
Senate's sectional balance between free and slave states against slaveholders but did so in a way that, ex post, proved to be permanent. The free territories of Minnesota and Oregon would be applying for statehood within a decade. True, to offset California, the compromise opened the Utah and New Mexico territories to slavery under the aegis of popular sovereignty, but few anticipated that slaveholders would be able to take full advantage of this concession in those arid lands. This led one historian, William W. Freehling (1994, p. 170) , to conclude, "southern congressmen surrendered California to the North in exchange for a new Fugitive Slave Law." Second, the measure seemed so obviously proslavery, in a draconian fashion, that many appear to believe that southern demands required no explanation at all. Often general surveys, such as David M. Potter's classic, The Impending Crisis (1976; pp. 112-3, 130-40; see also McPherson 1982, pp. 75-9) , proceed as if rendering an account of the historical antecedents--in which the Supreme Court's 1842 decision in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania resulted in a spate of northern personal liberty laws that undermined the effectiveness of the original fugitive-slave statute--is sufficient unto itself.
Third, these very same scholars, however, virtually dismiss the problem of runaway slaves. The number of runaways --perhaps a thousand per year --seems too small relative to a total slave population reaching nearly four million by 1860 to have made much difference. As Peter Geyl (1961, p. 198) asks, "were a few hundred fugitive slaves worth the risk of getting enmeshed in a destructive Civil War?" Finally, many historians follow Potter in arguing that the Fugitive Slave Act was counterproductive. Because it provoked northern opposition against slavery, it contributed to the crisis between the sections.
We are thus left with the paradox of slaveholders insisting upon a measure that was simultaneously unnecessary and counter-productive. Why did they foist such an odious statute upon Northerners if the main consequence was to turn many against the South who were otherwise indifferent?
One solution that historians have offered to this paradox is to emphasize the symbolic nature of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Southerners "clamored . . . for a stronger fugitive slave law," writes James M. McPherson (1988, p. 79) , "less for practical advantage than as a matter of principle.... [N] orthern aid to escaping slaves was an insult to southern honor." In combination with the above observations, this hypothesis implies that the motives for the act were psychological and irrational. The Fugitive Slave Act becomes another aspect of an exaggerated sense of southern honor that required primarily symbolic reassurances from the North. 1 Geyl concludes:
"Southerners clung to the law because they desired to have from the North an acknowledgment of their right rather than because of the material advantage."
Freehling stands as almost the sole exception among historians to this universal denigration of the fugitive-slave problem's practical significance. In his Road to Disunion (1990) , which highlights the differences and disagreements among antebellum Southerners, Freehling contends that runaways were a very serious matter for one group of slaveholders: those in the border slave states. Their vulnerability contributed both to a retreat of the peculiar institution toward the deeper South and to a crucial 1 The author who has most fully explored the theme of southern honor, although not with respect to the runaway slave problem, is Bertram Wyatt-Brown (1982) .
special interest prepared to demand better free-state compliance with the Constitution's fugitive-slave provision.
Like Freehling, we take issue with the standard symbolic interpretation of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Our argument has two components, one economic, one political. Building on Hummel (2001) , our economic analysis demonstrates, more strongly than even Freehling suggests, that the southern demand for this measure reflected rational concerns about runaways. For two reasons, the relevant set of slaves considering the problem of runaways is not all slaves as historians have assumed. First, because the old, the young, mothers, and the infirm were unlikely to run, we should consider prime age males -the most valuable slaves. Second, slaves in the deep South had hundreds of miles to run to freedom, whereas those in the border states much shorter distances to run.
We show that the probability of a prime age male from the border states running is quite significant -sufficiently high as to imply a hefty discount in a slave's value.
Traditional historians' observation about an order of 1000 runaways in a year against three million slaves in 1850 yields a trivial percentage of runaways -about .03 percent.
In contrast, the probability that a prime age male in Delaware ran in a given year was on the order of 5 percent, 250 times larger.
Equally important, we show that the fugitive slave act held important consequences for long-term coalition politics within the nation. Historians have looked at the act too narrowly, failing to see it as an instrument in the larger, ongoing national political struggle between the sections. We show that the act was part of a continuing and realistic effort by Southerners to maintain a secure home for the peculiar institution within a nation at best indifferent to slavery. One of the central means by which Southerners had protected their peculiar institution within the nation was the "balance rule," the notion that each section would maintain an equal number of states so that each held a veto over national policymaking through the Senate (Weingast 1998).
Maintaining balance created a territorial imperative for the South: northern growth implied that slave territory had to expand as well. In sum, we contest the traditional view that the fugitive slave act was an irrational measure sought by Southerners for symbolic reasons. We argue instead that this act served two separate instrumental purposes missed by most historians; one about the real problem of runaway males in the border states, the other about the future security of slavery in the nation.
This paper proceeds as follows. We next discuss the background for the crisis in 1850, explaining the long-term sources of rational anxiety for Southerners. These sources help explain southern motivation for seeking a new fugitive slave law. We then discuss our two hypotheses about the fugitive slave law, suggesting why it rationally fit the sources of southern anxiety. Finally, we draw the wider the implications of this approach for the rest of the decade and the Civil War.
Background to the Crisis
We discuss two issues as background to understanding the role of the fugitive slave law in the Compromise of 1850: the problem of slavery's security within the nation in the light of the rational coalitional anxiety raised by the Wilmot Proviso; and the problem of runaway slaves.
Security of slavery in the nation
Throughout the antebellum era, Southerners rationally worried about the security of their property. Nothing natural sustained the nation as one protecting the interests of southern slaveholders. A necessary condition for Southerners to participate in the union was that Northerners and the nation provide a credible commitment that the national government would not act against slavery. And if there were long periods of relative quiescence with little agitation about slavery and little ostensible concern by slaveholders, this occurred because slaveholders had demanded and received institutions that provided a credible commitment to protect slavery within the nation (see Weingast 1998 Weingast , 2000 .
As is well-known, the security of slavery was a concern during the Philadelphia convention of 1787 and helped shape a number of constitutional provisions (Finkelman 1987 (Finkelman , 1996 North and Rutten 1987; Rakove 1996 , Wiesek, 1987 . Beyond the Constitution, the country evolved a series of other protections for slavery, the most important of which became the balance between free and slave states (Weingast 1998).
This balance allowed both sections to retain a veto over national policymaking though equal representation in the Senate.
This veto provided the national credible commitment to protect slavery. As long as their veto remained in place, Southerners could protect themselves against hostile
Northerners. Moreover, it should be clear that this veto is not something that accumulates or that a party holding a veto comes close to (see Weingast 2000, ch2) .
Either a party has it or does not have. In voting institutions, there is no such thing as almost having a veto. Losing by one vote is no different than losing by 100. This implies that being one vote short of a veto is a far distance from actually holding a veto.
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The need to maintain the sectional veto created a territorial imperative for the South. In a growing nation, particularly a fast-past growing North, the South had to expand in order to retain parity. Most of the antebellum crises (1820, occurred when members of one or the other section felt disadvantaged in this growth.
For example, at moments when many Northerners feared southern growth would lead to southern dominance of national politics, they typically attacked slavery, as in 1819, creating the crisis over the Missouri, and again in 1846 with the Wilmot Proviso, creating the crisis over the Mexican cession. In both cases, the northern weapon was an attack on slavery. This northern strategy, in turn, reinforced Southerners' natural fears about the security of their property within the nation.
Moreover, balanced growth in a growing nation became the territorial imperative.
To maintain sectional balance, southern territorial expansion had to match northern territorial expansion. This is consistent with the economics literature, which shows that the economic stakes involved in the territorial expansion are too small to have motivated southern demand for expansion. See Passell and Wright (1972) .
Southerners hoped the territories acquired from Mexico would allow for the expansion of slavery, the Wilmot Proviso prevented this. Moreover, stalemate advantaged the North, since this allowed growth into free territories without any corresponding growth into slave territories.
Third, the discovery of gold in California drew so many people and resources, that it demanded political organization. The absence of even a territorial government hindered all the normal processes of government, including those supporting property rights and contracts. Moreover, not organizing California risked having it seek independence in order to provide the normal benefits from governmental organization.
Unfortunately for the South, no comparable slave territory stood in the wings ready for admission to maintain sectional balance. The admission of California alone threatened to tip the political balance permanently in favor of the North, and with it the demise of southern veto over national policymaking. Nonetheless, organizing territories without restrictions is not equivalent to reinstating sectional balance in the nation. Although territorial organization allowed slaveholders to move into these territories, it did not guarantee that Northerners would, at a future date, support the admission of a slave state to balance California. Nor did it guarantee that sufficient slaveholders would move to the state to create a viable slave state. The South's northern coalition partners in the House defected from the coalition in the Wilmot Proviso in 1846 and in every vote on the proviso during the many times it arose in 1847-49. This was a dangerous precedent and bode poorly for the long-term maintenance of a pro-southern coalition. Slaveholders would rational fear that, when the time came for their northern partners to vote for something inimical to their section, they would again defect.
The main implication is that organizing a territory today without restrictions was not nearly the same as voting to admit a slave state to balance California. Because a current Congress cannot bind a future Congress, Southerners faced a dilemma in 1850 -should they accept the compromise and hence the breaking of balance today, granting Northerners a numerical advantage that would allow them in the future to take advantage of the South were they to be opportunistically minded or, worse, fall prey to antislavery leadership? In exchange, Northerners were willing to organize two territories without restrictions and, through the Democratic party, provide a "promise" that, at a future date, they would accept another slave state were one to apply for admission.
Yet nothing today could bind Northerners to this promise in the future.
Northerners were clearly getting the better part of the deal.
The runaway slave problem
Runaway slaves constituted another major problem, about which Southerners complained constantly. John Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger (1999, p. 282) have estimated that total runaways exceeded 50,000 annually. This large number, however, includes short-term absences and unsuccessful attempts, as well as successful escapes to the free states or beyond. Franklin and Schweninger acknowledge that "most runaways remained out only a few weeks or months." The U.S. Censuses for 1850 and 1860, therefore, provide probably the most accurate glimpse at the problem of permanent runaways and--as several authors indicate (Hummel 2001, pp. 268-71; Gara 1961, p. 38, and 1964, p. 230 At first glance, these numbers seem small. The total U.S. slave population in 1850 was 3.2 million, meaning only 0.03 percent permanently escaped, while in 1860 slaves numbered nearly 4 million, with only 0.02 percent fleeing north. Slaveholders would tend to discount the value of any slave by a premium proportionate to the probability of losing their property. The higher the probability, the lower the price of the slave, other things equal. As a rough approximation (Hummel, 2001, pp. 406-11) , if the annual risk of permanent escape remained constant at p, and the annual interest rate was 10 percent, then a slave's price will fall from PV 0 , its value with no risk of running away, to PV p , as in formula (1): (1) PV p = (1 -p) PV 0 (.10)/(.10 + p). Table 1 illustrates how changes in this probability affect the price of a prime male hand whose value was $1,200 without any risk of permanent flight (p = 0). If only one out of every ten thousand prime hands ran away permanently (p = 0.0001, or 0.01 percent), the impact on average price would have been negligible. PV p would have fallen by merely $1. Raise the probability to one out of thousand (p = 0.001), and now average price will fall by $13, or a little over 1 percent. Assuming that one out of every hundred hands permanently ran off each year (p = 0.01), the effect becomes quite significant. PV p falls to $1,080, or by 10 percent. When the annual probability went up to one out of twenty (p = 0.05), the price would have dropped to $760, or by 37 percent.
And if the probability ever reached one of ten (p = 0.10), the value of all remaining male hands would have plummeted by over half to $540. 
Annual probabilities of permanent escape derived from the census figures (0.03 and 0.02 percent) appear so low as to have almost no effect. Historians have reasonably questioned whether there could be any tangible impacts on market prices of slaves.
This first impression is mistaken, however. The incidence of runaways was not uniform across all slaves but instead was concentrated in two ways. First, not all slaves were equally likely to escape. Infants, small children, and their mothers rarely ran away.
The same holds for the old and infirm. Runaways were usually able-bodied, prime-age males, in other words, those slaves with the highest productivity. This group, in the samples of Franklin and Schweninger (1999, p. 210 ; see also Genovese, 1974, pp. 648, 798) , constituted 70 to 80 percent of all runaways.
Second, location also mattered. A runaway heading north from South Carolina faced hundreds of miles of unknown and hostile territory. In contrast, slaves living in the upper South had to travel much shorter distances to the free states. They were thus more likely to risk an attempt. For the same reason, the effective range of the celebrated underground railroad (to the extent that it was effective at all) was confined to the free states and border regions of the slave states.
The census data therefore reveal that the number of permanent escapes as a percentage of a state's slave population was highest in Delaware, Maryland, and
Missouri (in that order); whereas South Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia were among those states having the smallest proportion of runaways in both 1850 and 1860.
Although Delaware was a very small state, if we add its total runaways to those of Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, they combine to more than half of all runaways for either census year. In contrast, these five states contained less than a fourth of the total slave population in 1860. (Hummel, 2001, pp. 304-5) .
Slaveholders in both the border and deep South were acutely aware of these differing probabilities, which consequently were reflected in slave prices. The same prime-age male was worth more in the deep South than in the upper South. The best long-run term series on slave prices in different regions (despite all of the more recent cliometric work of such economic historians as Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman)
remains that compiled at the beginning of the twentieth century by Ulrich B. Phillips. It covered four trading areas for the period 1795-1860. Although Phillips (1918, pp. 368-71; 1929, p. 177) presented his results only graphically, Evans (1962, pp. 197-202) rendered them into numbers. (See Table   3 ). Indeed, the decline in slave population was absolute for Delaware and Maryland.
Only in Kentucky was the percentage not approaching or already well below that of New York (10-12 percent) at the time of the American Revolution (Hummel, 2001, pp. 264-5; Freehling, 1994, pp. 28-29) .
Economic historians have tended to lump the approximate 10 percent difference in slave prices as one moved from the northern to the southern slave states together with a much larger difference as one moved from the eastern to the western slave states. Further, these historians attribute the entire difference to the greater productivity of the rich cotton lands of the Southwest. But the research of Yang and Friedman (1992, p. 263) suggests that the total differential of approximately 45 percent exceeded migration costs, such as transport and foregone earnings, by about 8 percent, no doubt because their price estimates capture both east-west and north-south gradients. Either running away or superior land would have affected a field hand's productivity, and the two would have interacted to draw slaves out of the periphery into the Southwest. For our purposes, the relative importance of the two effects does not matter. What matters is that both contributed to a decline of slavery in the upper South.
We must now ask why this risk of runaways, with its affect on the slave distribution within the South, matters, particularly to the deep South, where the price impact was trivial. Let us return to the political problem of the security of slavery within the United States. As noted, sectional balance was critical to maintaining southern security through a veto over national policy. Yet this veto depended not only a balance of free with slave states; it also depended on the nominal slave state remaining slave states and having a political commitment to slavery's future. Sectional balance could be upset both by adding more free than slave states and by a slave state losing its commitment to slavery.
The peculiar institution's steady decline in the upper tier of slave states implied that, every year, their economic commitment to the institution declined. By 1860, the antislavery Republican Party was already a political force within the border slave state of Missouri. This epitomized the risk, over the long run, of defections from the proslavery coalition and hence represented another potential threat to the Southern veto and to slaveholders' property. To forestall this threat, Southerners had to lower the probability of success for runaways. The answer was a revision of the fugitive slave law.
Conclusions
In 1850, slaveholders faced two risks to their principal source of long-term political security within the nation, their veto over national policymaking through sectional balance. First, the admission of California without a slave state to balance it directly threatened the southern veto. Second, the migration of slaves out of the border regions into the deep South threatened to loosen the commitment of the peripheral slaveholders to slavery; again, threatening southern veto through sectional balance.
These risks set the stage for southern behavior during the negotiations over the Compromise of 1850.
The Economic Effects of the Fugitive Slave Law
We argue that the purpose of the fugitive slave law was twofold. First, the law was designed to have a direct and instrumental effect on runaways, providing greater -if not complete -legal tools for slaveholders to recapture lost property. Second, and subtler, the law was designed to provide Southerners with critical information about their northern coalition partners. We discuss these two effects separately.
Reducing the number of permanent runaways
The law's instrumental purpose was to lower the probability of successful runaways. Congress had initially passed legislation enforcing the Constitution's fugitive slave clause in 1793, at the end of President George Washington's first term. The recovery of runaways was put under joint supervision of national and state courts. Not only did the free states willingly cooperate at first, but many of them allowed Southerners to bring along slaves on visits, sometimes for up to nine months (Finkelman, 1996 (Finkelman, . 1981 ; 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 303-5).
But radical abolitionists put this first Fugitive Slave Law under fire during the 1830s and 1840s. They legally challenged it in the courts and illegally evaded it. The illegal evasion led to the underground railroad, while the legal challenges induced several northern legislatures to pass personal liberty laws (see Drobak 1994 and Finkelman 1981) . These laws tried to prevent the kidnapping and enslavement of northern free blanks by granting alleged fugitives such rights as habeas corpus and trial by jury (Morris 1974) .
One case arising under the personal liberty laws finally found its way to the Supreme Court in 1842. The Court's decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania was a pro-and anti-slavery mixture. It granted slaveholders the right to recapture slaves using private force, without going through any legal process, state or federal. But Justice Joseph
Story, rendering the Court's majority opinion, also conceded that the state governments were under no positive obligation to assist enforcement of the fugitive slave provision (Finkelman 1979 One of the harshest congressional measures ever, the new act created a special category of federal court officials, called commissioners, to help slaveholders seize fugitives. The circuit courts appointed the commissioners, who had concurrent jurisdiction with the district and circuit court judges and were delegated broad police powers for the reclamation of fugitives. The commissioners could issue warrants, employ U.S. marshals, depose witnesses, and arrest and imprison offenders. All the slaveholder or his agent had to do to prove his case was present an affidavit from some legal officer in his home state. The alleged runaway not only had no right to a jury trial but could not even testify. Furthermore, commissioners had a financial incentive to rule against the fugitive. They received a $10 fee from the claimant for deciding that a black was an escaped slave, but only $5 for not. To enhance enforcement, Congress empowered federal officials to conscript the physical aid of any private citizen.
Obstructing the law was subject to a $1000 fine, six months in prison, and $1000 civil damages for each escaped slave (9 U.S. Statutes at Large 462-5).
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With this law, Southerners put the North on notice that nothing--not due legal process, not civil liberties, not even the cherished principle of state sovereignty--could stand in the way of masters recovering their human chattel. Whether the law would actually achieve its goal was another matter. Northern mobs ended up attacking slave catchers, broke into jails, and rescued fugitive slaves. The national government tried vigorously to prosecute these law breakers, but northern juries refused to convict them.
In some cases, the authorities had to rely upon military force. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 also sparked stronger personal liberty laws. Beginning with Vermont, nine states either provided for legal defense of alleged runaways or openly defied the national government by requiring jury trial, habeas corpus, and other procedural safeguards.
Yet the Fugitive Slave Law was far from a dead letter. The illegal rescues and legal obstructions received all the publicity but the successful apprehensions and ultimate returns were more numerous. Stanley W. Campbell (1970, pp. 110-47, 199-207) has tracked down details of 332 fugitive slave cases in the ten years after passage of the law. Over half, 191, went before a federal tribunal, while the other 141 involved slaveowners or their agents seizing runaways without recourse to judicial process. In only 22 cases were blacks rescued from custody, only 1 escaped on his own, and another 11 were released. Thus, in almost 90 percent of the total cases, or 80 percent of the federal cases, the fugitive was hauled back South. Moreover, many private seizures were almost certainly unrecorded. Of course, that is also true of many permanent slave escapes, as we have already observed.
We noted above that in the half decade from 1856 to 1860, the price differential between prime field hands in Charleston and Richmond had fallen for the first time Consider the following stylized interaction (based on a signaling game).
Southerners were uncertain about the northern pivot's willingness to support future proslavery measures. Before Southerners decide whether to accept the compromise, they provide a test for Northerners in which the northern pivot must decide whether to support a costly, pro-southern measure today, viz., the fugitive slave act.
Signaling sometimes allows the uncertain player -here, the Southerners -to learn about the type of player they are facing -here, whether the northern pivot is pro- Senator Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia later identified passage of the Soulé amendment as "the turning point" in the debate over the compromise, and it eventually ended up in the final version of the compromise when passed as several separate acts (Fehrenbacher 1978, pp. 171-2) .
Legally the amendment was useless, since it could in no way bind a future
Congress. Per our interpretation, Soulé himself claimed he wanted "to feel the pulse of the Senate" about a series of acts he believed to be "binding in the future." As the late
historian Don E. Fehrenbacher (1978, p. 172) emphasizes: "He meant binding, not in law but as a pledge of honor, with the threat of disunion serving as the sanctional force.
. . . Here . . . was a view of the compromise legislation as a set of pledges negotiated like an international treaty, the violation of which would lead to sovereign reprisals." But before Southerners would even enter such a treaty, they needed some assurance that
Northerners could in fact uphold their promise to admit future slave states. Hence, the importance of their votes on the Fugitive Slave Act.
Implications
We argue that the northern pivot's support was a necessary condition for southern support of the compromise. Given the pervasive uncertainty about the future of national politics, the South faced a difficult dilemma in 1850, and the fugitive slave law proved useful for reducing this uncertainty.
The value of the fugitive slave act to the South was therefore twofold. First, as noted in the previous section, the act served its ostensible purpose of facilitating the return of runaway slaves. Second, the act served an instrumental, signaling purpose of forcing the northern pivot to reveal its type today. As a revelation mechanism, the fugitive slave act provided critical information to southerners about the risks of supporting the compromise. By supporting the fugitive slave act, the pivotal northern member of Congress revealed his ability to support pro-southern measures opposed by most Northerners.
Implications and Conclusions
A major weakness in the literature on the Compromise of 1850 is that it fails to explain why the specific measures of the compromise resolved the crisis. Without a clear understanding of the problem, it is difficult to assess how the various measures that comprised the compromise settled the dispute. the Oregon territory, to the detriment of northern claims (Potter 1976, pp. 25-6 Although small in number relative to the millions of slaves in the entire South, we argue that this is not the relevant set from which to measure the importance of runaways.
First, slaves in the deep South had hundreds of miles to run to reach slavery and were thus much less likely to run than those in the border states. Second, the old, the young, mothers, and the infirm were unlikely to run; rather, it was males of prime age, precisely those slaves with the highest value, who were most likely to run. Looking at these categories, we show that the probability of a prime age male running in the border states is sufficiently high as to imply a hefty discount on a slave's value. Put simply, runaways were a major problem in the border states.
Second, the compromise addressed the issue of sectional balance in several ways. First, Northerners agreed to recede from the Wilmot Proviso for the first time in four years. Second, the compromise created the New Mexico and Utah territories "without restrictions" on slavery. But voting today to organize territories was not the same as voting to admit a slave state. Indeed, in the face of the Northerners' steadfast adherence to the Wilmot Proviso over the previous four years, Southerners would have been quite uncertain about whether, at some point in the future, they would vote to admit a slave state to balance California.
We argue that the fugitive slave act served a third instrumental purpose for Southerners in 1850. It provided a test for their northern coalition partners. Admitting a slave state in the future would require that sufficient Northerners agree to vote with the South against their constituent's interests to expand the number of slave states.
Southerners in 1850 were uncertain about whether Northerners would do this in the future. So they devised a test -by asking them to pass a measure sufficiently pro-slavery as to be odious in North. The logic reflects a signaling game -if the Southerners' northern coalition partners could not vote to pass this measure today, they were unlikely to be able to bear their constituency pressure against voting to admit a slave state in the future.
The advantage of including the fugitive slave act as part of the Compromise of 1850, in this view, is that it provided a test for Northerners to reveal whether they were sufficiently strong cooperators with the South. Specifically, the measure forced The Georgia Platform, interpreted (and often voted on) throughout the South as the rationale for acceptance of the compromise, argued: first, that the South would accept the compromise so long as the North did; second, that if the North failed to do so, Southerners reserved the right to exit the Union (Potter 1976, pp. 128-9) .
In contrast to the traditional historical arguments, we disagree that the fugitive slave act was principally about the psychology of southern honor. Southern honor may well have been important, but so too were the instrumental aspects of including the fugitive slave act in the compromise.
This inclusion provided Southerners with important information about the future prospects for the coalitional politics that had supported the South through the Democratic party, but which had fallen apart in the years in which the Wilmot Proviso had predominated, making national politics far more sectional than usual. The 
